VS - China Spanning stijgt: China en de VS bereiden zich voor op oorlog? Taiwan crisis! (Mei 2024)
Het grootste territoriale geschil van Azië - het bepalen van de soevereiniteit over de Zuid-Chinese Zee - bereikte een historisch keerpunt in 2016 toen een internationaal tribunaal van het Permanent Hof van Arbitrage (PCA) in Den Haag uitspraak deed op een Filippijnse aanvraag, om te verduidelijken dat historische records geen rechtsgrondslag voor de claim van China op 95% van de zee voor de zuidkust. Brunei, Maleisië, de Filippijnen, Taiwan en Vietnam vochten met China om de controle te behouden over de 200 zeemijl lange exclusieve maritieme economische zone (EEZ) die zich uitstrekte vanaf elk van hun kusten. Indonesië en China betwistten ook de wateren van dezelfde zee rond een groep van 272 eilandjes. Het was echter vooral China dat zijn kustwacht in omstreden wateren stuurde en land terugwon en daar militair materieel installeerde.
De unanieme uitspraak van het tribunaal op 12 juli 2016 werd bespot door China, wiens minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Wang Yi het vonnis een "farce" noemde. China weigerde deel te nemen aan het acht maanden durende arbitrageproces en zei dat de rechtbank niet bevoegd was om over een maritieme soevereiniteitskwestie te beslissen door de rechtsgrondslag van zijn vordering die normaal gesproken wordt afgebakend door een lijn met negen streepjes, af te wijzen. China traceerde het gebruik van de zee tot documenten die werden gebruikt tijdens de Oostelijke Han-dynastie (23–220 n.Chr.). Die documenten vormden samen met modernere documenten de huidige claim van negen streepjeslijnen in China. De Filipijnen hadden in januari 2013 arbitrage aangevraagd.
De arbitrage-uitspraak veranderde het geschil van een toenemende vijandigheid in een waarin partijen beoordeelden of ze met Peking konden onderhandelen. De Filippijnse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Perfecto Yasay vroeg 'alle betrokkenen om terughoudend en nuchter te zijn'. Zijn regering stuurde voormalig president Fidel Ramos in augustus naar Hong Kong om Chinese functionarissen te ontmoeten om de door de arbitrage aangetaste betrekkingen te herstellen. Evenzo heeft de Vietnamese premier Nguyen Xuan Phuc in september een ontmoeting gehad met de Chinese premier Li Keqiang. Andere eisers maakten na de uitspraak ook verzoenende opmerkingen. "Hoewel rechtbanken de juridische kwesties kunnen verduidelijken, eisen ze dat alle partijen ermee instemmen zich te onderwerpen aan hun bevindingen, een scenario dat in de nabije toekomst onwaarschijnlijk is", aldus Tim Johnston van de niet-gouvernementele organisatie International Crisis Group."Het is zeker in ieders strategische en economische belang om te onderhandelen over een voor beide partijen aanvaardbare oplossing."
De Zuid-Chinese Zee beslaat 3,5 miljoen vierkante kilometer (1,4 miljoen vierkante mijl) van Taiwan tot Singapore en bevat ongeveer 500 kleine, meestal onbewoonbare riffen, atollen en zandbanken. De tropische zee wordt gewaardeerd om zijn overvloedige visgronden en zijn fossiele brandstofreserves. De Amerikaanse Energy Information Administration (EIA) schatte dat er 11 miljard bbl aan olie en 5,4 biljoen cu m (190 triljoen cu ft) aardgas onder de zee zaten. De helft van het scheepvaartverkeer in de wereld maakt ook gebruik van de zee.
The sovereignty dispute cropped up in the 1970s with a rise in oil exploration but triggered only sporadic clashes, such as a 1988 incident in which 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed. The quarrel escalated diplomatically in 2012 when it became clear that China was on a mission to expand its holdings, potentially cutting into fishing, fossil-fuel exploration, and coast-guard patrols by the other countries with continental-shelf claims.
In the Paracel archipelago, also claimed by Vietnam, for example, Beijing added hangars, munitions-storage buildings, batteries of surface-to-air missile launchers, and military-use radars at a base on Woody Island. China was also building on Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, which were contested by all five of the other claimants. Beijing reclaimed at least 1,174 ha (2,900 ac) of land while enlarging tiny islets for its use.
When China’s state-invested oil firm CNOOC Ltd. parked an oil rig in May 2014 near the Paracel Islands—waters that Vietnam also claimed—Vietnamese and Chinese vessels rammed each other nearby, and ensuing anti-Chinese protests and rioting in Vietnam resulted in 21 deaths. To protect its claims Vietnam had reclaimed some 50 ha (120 ac) covering at least 27 land features in the sea as of May 2016, according to the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Taiwan claimed the entire sea but lacked diplomatic relations in Asia and had not expanded militarily except for work around its airstrip on Taiping, the contested sea’s largest natural land feature. In January 2016 then-president of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou visited Taiping, claiming that it was an island worthy of an EEZ, an idea the arbitration court rejected.
It was then Philippine president Benigno Aquino III who pushed back hardest against China. On April 8, 2012, a Philippine navy surveillance plane discovered eight Chinese fishing vessels massed near Scarborough Shoal, 198 km (123 mi) west of the Philippines, possibly looking for exotic and protected species. China sent a pair of surveillance ships to stop Philippine authorities from making arrests. For the next two months, their vessels were locked in a standoff, inciting protests in the Philippines and calls for a boycott in China. “I think the short answer to how the situation got to the point where the Philippines chose to pursue the case through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is that it saw that as the only option available to stop the relentless pursuit by China of changing the facts on the ground,” said Carl Baker, director of programs with the Pacific Forum CSIS.
Aquino asked the PCA to rule on the validity of China’s nine-dash line claim and the use of the continental-shelf-based claims of other countries. The request for arbitration was “complementary to the rebuilding of the Philippine armed forces,” said Ramon Casiple of the Philippine advocacy group Institute for Political and Electoral Reform. “At some future time, the Philippines may open talks with China with some leverages on its hands.”
That time might be soon. Southeast Asian maritime claimants relied heavily on trade with and investment from China, the world’s second largest economy. In the event of a war, no one in Southeast Asia could expect to beat the Chinese military, which many ranked the third strongest in the world. In 2014 the Philippines signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with former colonizer the United States, allowing for the stationing of a rotation of U.S. troops in the Philippines and for joint military exercises. Philippine Pres. Rodrigo Duterte, who took office in June 2016, angrily asked the United States to stop the joint exercises as part of what he called a more-independent foreign policy that included alliances with China and Russia. A change to the agreement, however, would require Philippine legislative approval, and in October the U.S. embassy in Manila stated that it planned to keep up cooperation.
China itself wanted to be seen as a good neighbour, particularly after the arbitration verdict. Chinese enterprises depended increasingly on the markets and development needs of surrounding countries, since domestic economic growth had slowed since 2010. Between 2004 and 2013, China’s overseas investments reportedly increased more than 13 times, to $613 billion. Because China outweighed the other claimants militarily and economically, it would have an edge in any bilateral talks.
China considered its informal arrangement with Malaysia to be a template for its dealings with other countries. Malaysian officials seldom sounded off against Beijing’s maritime expansion, analysts claimed, because China was Malaysia’s top trading partner and source of direct foreign investment. The EIA estimated that Malaysia controlled reserves of five billion barrels of crude oil and 2.3 trillion cu m (80 trillion cu ft) of natural gas in the sea, more than the other claimants.
“It’s a two-way street in terms of how much leaders can get,” according to Ibrahim Suffian, program director with the Malaysian polling group Merdeka Center. In Malaysia, he said, “overall the attitude toward China has been more positive and relations are governed by that.”
