Emotiepsychologie

De fysieke uitdrukking van emotie

Er is veel onderzoek gedaan naar emotionele expressie, met name naar de uitdrukkingen die het meest direct, het meest duidelijk en het meest spontaan of automatisch zijn en dus vaak onbekend bij het onderwerp dat ze vertoont. Darwin merkte de opvallende overeenkomst op tussen de emotionele uitingen van veel zoogdieren en mensen; hij postuleerde dus zowel een evolutionaire verklaring van de gelijkenis als een antropologische stelling dat gezichtsuitdrukkingen van emotie, zoals die van woede, verrassing en angst, universeel zijn in de mens. In de jaren zestig wilde de Amerikaanse psycholoog Paul Ekman de antropologische stelling van Darwin weerleggen, maar tot zijn eerste consternatie ontdekte hij dat dit werd bevestigd door het opdoen van intercultureel bewijs. Sindsdien,studies van de karakteristieke gezichtsuitdrukkingen van verschillende emoties en hun herkenning zijn een dominant onderwerp geweest in psychologisch onderzoek. Natuurlijk hebben niet alle emoties karakteristieke gezichtsuitdrukkingen, en daarom concentreren studies zich meestal op een klein aantal basisemoties - bijvoorbeeld woede, walging, angst, vreugde, verdriet en verrassing. Elk van deze emoties bestaat volgens veel theoretici uit een 'affectprogramma' - een complexe reeks gezichtsuitdrukkingen, vocalisaties en autonome en skeletreacties. Het is nog steeds de vraag of emoties die zogenaamd fundamenteel zijn, kunnen worden vastgelegd in affectprogramma's; het is dus ook controversieel of de herkenning en productie van typische gezichtsuitdrukkingen inderdaad universeel en 'hardwired' zijn.Natuurlijk hebben niet alle emoties karakteristieke gezichtsuitdrukkingen, en daarom concentreren studies zich meestal op een klein aantal basisemoties - bijvoorbeeld woede, walging, angst, vreugde, verdriet en verrassing. Elk van deze emoties bestaat volgens veel theoretici uit een 'affectprogramma' - een complexe reeks gezichtsuitdrukkingen, vocalisaties en autonome en skeletreacties. Het is nog steeds de vraag of emoties die zogenaamd fundamenteel zijn, kunnen worden vastgelegd in affectprogramma's; het is dus ook controversieel of de herkenning en productie van typische gezichtsuitdrukkingen inderdaad universeel en 'hardwired' zijn.Natuurlijk hebben niet alle emoties karakteristieke gezichtsuitdrukkingen, en daarom concentreren studies zich meestal op een klein aantal basisemoties - bijvoorbeeld woede, walging, angst, vreugde, verdriet en verrassing. Elk van deze emoties bestaat volgens veel theoretici uit een 'affectprogramma' - een complexe reeks gezichtsuitdrukkingen, vocalisaties en autonome en skeletreacties. Het is nog steeds de vraag of emoties die zogenaamd fundamenteel zijn, kunnen worden vastgelegd in affectprogramma's; het is dus ook controversieel of de herkenning en productie van typische gezichtsuitdrukkingen inderdaad universeel en 'hardwired' zijn.bestaat uit een 'affectprogramma': een complexe reeks gezichtsuitdrukkingen, vocalisaties en autonome en skeletreacties. Het is nog steeds de vraag of emoties die zogenaamd fundamenteel zijn, kunnen worden vastgelegd in affectprogramma's; het is dus ook controversieel of de herkenning en productie van typische gezichtsuitdrukkingen inderdaad universeel en 'hardwired' zijn.bestaat uit een 'affectprogramma': een complexe reeks gezichtsuitdrukkingen, vocalisaties en autonome en skeletreacties. Het is nog steeds de vraag of emoties die zogenaamd fundamenteel zijn, kunnen worden vastgelegd in affectprogramma's; het is dus ook controversieel of de herkenning en productie van typische gezichtsuitdrukkingen inderdaad universeel en 'hardwired' zijn.

menselijk zenuwstelsel: emotie en gedrag

Om correct gedrag uit te voeren - dat wil zeggen correct in relatie tot het voortbestaan ​​van het individu - hebben mensen zich aangeboren ontwikkeld

One of the fascinating features of spontaneous facial expressions is how difficult it is for most people to “fake” a sincere expression. This is perhaps most evident in the case of smiling (as an expression of delight or being pleased). Psychologists have long recognized the Duchenne smile (named for the French neurologist Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne [1806–75]), a sincere and spontaneous smile that is characterized not only by the stretching of the mouth but also by the elevation of the cheeks and the distinctive contraction of the muscles around the eye. In a false or non-Duchenne smile, these other elements are lacking and, for that reason, it is easy to recognize a false smile even if one has no idea what it is that gives it away.

The behavioral expression of emotion also includes conscious and unconscious gestures, postures and mannerisms, and overt behaviour that can be either spontaneous or deliberate. One might hesitate to call deliberate behaviour an “expression” because of the intervening conscious activity it involves. One might speak instead of such behaviour as being “out of” the emotion (as in, “he acted out of anger”). Yet the difference between the two cases is often very slight. Acting out of anger may be immediate, as in the case of a spontaneous insult, or it may be protracted or delayed. It may be expressed in a series of punitive actions that go on for months or years or in vengeful acts that follow the provoking occurrence and the anger by an equally lengthy period of time. But even the immediate expression of emotion in overt action may be (and usually is) protracted in time and not merely momentary. Running from danger in fear may go on for as long as it needs to (as long as the threat is evident). The expression of profound love, many people would say, goes on for a lifetime, though it may also consist of any number of both spontaneous and deliberate acts and gestures.

Verbal expressions are of particular interest. They can be spontaneous and immediate, as are the hoots and cheers of sports fans, but they can obviously be more eloquent, articulate, and deliberate. A funeral oration may be heartfelt and expressive of the emotion of grief; an apology can also be heartfelt and expressive of the emotions of shame and remorse. And of course the recitation of a love poem can serve as an expansive “I love you.”

Experiential structures of emotion

James introduced his theory of emotions with an important qualification: “I should say first of all that the only emotions I propose expressly to consider here are those that have a distinct bodily expression.” Although there are emotions that do not have any such expression, James insisted that all emotions have a mental or conscious dimension.

The initiating cause of emotion, according to James, is a perception. James did not take perception to be a constituent of emotion, but he clearly recognized its importance. To put the matter in a way that he did not, James recognized that an emotion must be “about” something. It is not just a feeling based on a physiological disturbance. Thus, James alluded to intentionality, the feature of some mental processes in virtue of which they are essentially about or directed toward an object. Many theorists following James have revised his analysis by including perception, and with it intentionality, as an essential part of emotion. Indeed, some theorists have claimed that an emotion is just a special kind of perception. The concept of emotional experience, accordingly, has been considerably enriched to include not only physical sensations of what is going on in one’s body but also perceptual experiences of what is going on the world. In the study of emotion, of course, that perspective is an emotional perspective, “coloured” by the various emotions as well as by the unique perspective of the subject. But the common metaphor of colour does not do justice to emotional experience. Emotion is not something that is distinct from and somehow overlays an experience; the experience is part of the structure of the emotion itself.

The experiential structures of emotion include, first and foremost, intentionality and what the emotion is about—a person, an act, an event, or a state of affairs. But intentionality is structured in turn by the subject’s beliefs and evaluative judgments about the person, act, event, or state of affairs in question. The importance of belief in emotion has prompted many theorists to formulate “cognitive” theories of emotion, while an emphasis on evaluation has led others to formulate “appraisal” theories. Such theories are often very similar, varying mainly in their emphasis on the primary importance of belief as opposed to evaluative judgment. They do not challenge the importance of what is generally referred to as “feeling” in emotion, but they do make the nature of those feelings much more complex and intriguing than in the Jamesian view. Emotions involve knowledge, beliefs, opinions, and desires about the world. Thus, feeling must include not only bodily feelings but the cognitively rich experiences of knowing, engaging, and caring.

The experiential dimension of an emotion includes not only physical sensations but the experience of an object and its environment through the unique perspective provided by that emotion. The experience of being angry at Smith, for example, consists to a large extent in the experience of Smith from a certain perspective—e.g., as being offensive, hateful, or deserving of punishment. The experience of being in love with Jones consists to a large extent in the experience of Jones from another perspective—e.g., as being lovable, special, or uniquely deserving of care. The experiences of anger and love also include various thoughts and memories and intentions to act in certain ways.

Emotional experience also includes pleasure and pain, as Aristotle insisted, but rarely as isolated feelings. More often, different aspects of an emotion are pleasurable or painful, as thoughts or memories may be pleasurable or painful. The emotion as such may be pleasurable or painful (e.g., pride or remorse), and so may one’s acknowledgement of the fact that one has a certain emotion (delighted to be in love again, upset with oneself for getting angry or envious). But, again, emotional matters are not always so straightforward. It is common to have “mixed emotions,” when the countercurrents of pleasure and pain make it difficult to settle on a single state of mind.