Camp David stemt in met de Egyptisch-Israëlische geschiedenis
Camp David stemt in met de Egyptisch-Israëlische geschiedenis

Israel en het Midden-Oosten (Mei 2024)

Israel en het Midden-Oosten (Mei 2024)
Anonim

Camp David Accords, overeenkomsten tussen Israël en Egypte die op 17 september 1978 werden ondertekend en die het volgende jaar tot een vredesverdrag tussen die twee landen leidden, het eerste dergelijke verdrag tussen Israël en een van zijn Arabische buren. Bemiddeld door US Pres. Jimmy Carter tussen de Israëlische premier Menachem Begin en de Egyptische president. Anwar Sadat, die officieel het 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East' heette, werden de Camp David-akkoorden genoemd omdat de onderhandelingen plaatsvonden tijdens de Amerikaanse presidentiële retraite in Camp David, Maryland. Sadat en Begin kregen in 1978 de Nobelprijs voor de vrede voor hun bijdragen aan de overeenkomsten.

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Achtergrond

De Verenigde Naties (VN) stemden in 1947 om het Palestijnse mandaat van Groot-Brittannië te verdelen - dat zou worden opgericht was een Joodse staat, een Arabische staat en een onafhankelijk Jeruzalem onder een VN-trustschap. Arabieren waren tegen opdeling. Toen het mandaat op 15 mei 1948 afliep en Israël de onafhankelijkheid uitriep, brak de eerste Arabisch-Israëlische oorlog uit. Er werd geen aparte staat voor Arabische Palestijnen (dwz Palestijnen) opgericht. Egypte nam de controle over de Gazastrook langs de Middellandse Zee en Jordanië nam de soevereiniteit over het gebied tussen de oostgrens van Israël en de Jordaan (de Westelijke Jordaanoever), inclusief Oost-Jeruzalem, in handen. Tijdens de Zesdaagse Oorlog van juni 1967 bezette Israël die gebieden, evenals de Golanhoogten - een stukje Syrisch land aan de noordoostelijke grens van Israël - en het Egyptische Sinaï-schiereiland. Na zijn verkiezing tot Amerikaanse president,Carter zette zich in voor een alomvattende vredesregeling in het Midden-Oosten op basis van VN-resolutie 242 (november 1967), waarin werd opgeroepen tot terugtrekking van Israël uit de bezette gebieden, Arabische erkenning van en vrede met Israël (bepalingen die de Arabische staten hadden geweigerd instemmen met), en een rechtvaardige regeling voor het probleem van Palestijnse vluchtelingen die zijn ontheemd door de oprichting van Israël en de oorlog van 1967.

Early in his presidency, Carter met with leaders of the Middle East and was especially encouraged by President Sadat. Sadat wanted the Israeli-occupied Sinai returned to Egypt, as well as peace for his people and a stronger relationship with the United States. The U.S. president also met with Begin, who had only recently become prime minister, and found him willing to consider the measures that Carter had discussed with Sadat.

In November 1977 Sadat initiated direct contacts with Israel and made a dramatic visit to Jerusalem, where he spoke to the Israeli Knesset (parliament). However, a reciprocal visit by Begin was unsuccessful, and no progress was made toward peace. Rosalynn Carter, the U.S. first lady, then suggested to her husband that he invite Sadat and Begin to Camp David, in rural Maryland, where the relative privacy and seclusion might provide a setting for a breakthrough.

The summit

The two leaders accepted Carter’s invitation, and the summit began on September 5, 1978, and lasted for 13 days. It was extremely unusual for heads of state to engage in a summit meeting at which the outcome was so much in doubt. Not only had Egypt and Israel been at war for decades, but the personality differences of the leaders promised to complicate the dialogue. Begin, always formal in dress and manner, was extremely detail-oriented and careful about the possible ramifications of any agreements. He was pessimistic about what he believed could be achieved at Camp David and insisted that the objective be limited to developing an agenda for future meetings. By contrast, Sadat wore fashionable sports clothes, was relaxed and forthcoming, and was willing to join in comprehensive negotiations aimed at settling all controversial issues during the few days of the summit.

All three men were accompanied by their leading foreign policy advisers, but Carter preferred that the three men work together in private sessions in a small office at Aspen, his cabin at Camp David. He also insisted that there be no direct press coverage of the meetings, fearing it would have a negative effect on negotiations. A humorous situation arose right before the first meeting, an awkward moment that nonetheless shed light on the personalities involved. After President Carter and the first lady entered the cabin, Begin and Sadat hesitated over who should follow through the doorway. Both men laughed, and Begin insisted that Sadat proceed first. As the first lady noted later, “Jimmy said to me that Begin would never go ahead of Sadat, being perfectly proper according to protocol—president above prime minister.”

After three days of negotiations, the heated discussions reached an impasse, and direct discourse between Sadat and Begin became impossible. Carter then compiled a single document that encompassed a resolution of the major issues, presented the proposals to each leader in separate meetings, assessed their comments, and redrafted the manuscript some two dozen times, shuttling the manuscript back and forth for their review. (This single-document method became a mainstay of Carter’s post-presidency work at the Carter Center to resolve international disputes.)

As the days passed, prospects for a settlement at Camp David appeared so bleak that Sadat threatened to leave, and Carter began planning to return to the White House and suffer the likely political consequences of failure. An agreement was reached on the final day, however, when, at the last minute, Begin agreed to allow the Knesset to decide the fate of the settlements Israelis had established on the Sinai Peninsula (which Sadat had required dismantled and Begin had sworn not to abandon).

A framework for peace

The eventual outcome of these talks, the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” had three parts: (1) a process for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza, (2) a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and (3) a similar framework for peace treaties between Israel and its other neighbours. The prime minister and the Israeli Knesset agreed that a transitional self-governing Palestinian authority was to be elected to replace Israeli political and military forces in the occupied territories.

The peace treaty that Israel and Egypt signed in March 1979 closely reflected President Carter’s proposals at Camp David and formally ended the state of war that had existed between the two countries. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai, and Egypt promised to establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries and open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships (which until then had been banned from the waterway). These provisions were duly carried out. However, most Arab countries, rather than following Egypt’s lead, ostracized Egypt and expelled it from the Arab League. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), professing to speak for the Palestinian people, also rejected the accords. Nonetheless, the next major advance in Middle East peace negotiations, the Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993, included provisions with regard to the West Bank and Gaza that were similar to those in the Camp David Accords. These included a transitional period, an elected self-governing Palestinian authority, withdrawal of the Israeli military government and redeployment of Israeli troops, the establishment of a local police force, and a plan to move ahead with negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.